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## **PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

Germany has long endured violence from various forms of extremism including ultra-right, far-left, and faith-based. More recently, Islamism has posed a large and growing threat to Germany, and 2016 was marked by a series of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks. Since September 11, 2001, more German citizens have died in Islamist terror attacks than in the entire history of violence perpetrated by the Red Army Faction, a far-left German terror group that operated in Germany for over thirty years. As early as 2014, the Federal Criminal Police has warned that the largest threat in Germany emanates from Islamist terror attacks perpetrated by fanatic individuals or small groups attack. More than half of them reside in Germany, while 153 are currently detained [1].

Germany has experienced an influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa in recent years, with more than 44 percent originating from Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria. Germany, at its peak, processed approximately 746,000 asylum applications in 2016. German authorities have warned that asylum seekers are at risk for radicalization by domestic Salafist jihadists of which there are currently an estimated 10,800 within the country. Additionally, ISIS has reportedly used migratory routes to smuggle fighters into Germany and worked to recruit asylum seekers. As of April 2018, about 1,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have left Germany and traveled to fight alongside extremist groups abroad. Of those that left, one third has since returned to Germany, and about 150 are believed to have been killed abroad [1].

Germany regularly experiences anti-immigrant and racist-related violence. Far-right propaganda and hate speech offenses as well as assault typically occurs during protests and marches. However, about 20 far-right extremists reportedly attacked six Pakistanis in Cologne in January 2016, leaving two victims hospitalized. According to the German interior minister, right-wing extremists were responsible for more than 90 percent of anti-Semitic crimes and similar percentage of anti-Islamic crimes in 2019. Anti-Semitic attacks surged by 13 percent compared to 2018. Far-right extremists were also credited with committing more than half of all politically motivated crimes, which rose by 14 percent in 2019 from 2018. The number of far-left extremists in Germany has increased by almost 6 percent in 2017 compared to 2016, and a third are believed to be prone to violence. Notably, extremist-leftist protesters and German police violently clashed during the July 2017 G20 Summit in Hamburg. The protesters threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, caused fires, and looted shops. Police responded with water cannons and teargas [1].

### **Functions and missions**

The GTAZ (Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre), based in Berlin, is not an autonomous authority but a joint co-operation and communication platform in the field of Islamic terrorism used by 40 internal security agencies. It was set up on 14 December 2004.

The GETZ (Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism) started its work on 15 November 2012 and is located in Cologne. Here, co-operation between the police and the community of the German domestic intelligence services, between the Federation and the federal states in the fields of right-wing extremism/terrorism, left-wing extremism/terrorism, extremism of foreigners, counter-espionage and proliferation is organized under one roof [2].

Additionally, the GSG 9 of the German Federal Police is a counter-terrorism/special intervention unit for operations against organized crime and terrorist threats. Trained especially to handle complex attack scenarios and hostage-taking situations in the home country or abroad (in buildings, aircraft, public transportation, maritime objects). Standing procedures are operations / undercover operations against organized crime including using of weapons, EOD or dangerous goods and assistance for the BKA, State Police and Customs to arrest dangerous criminals and terrorists. The GSG 9 carries out special skills and tactics, disposes of specialized equipment and is in charge of examination and further development of all involved procedures. The unit has the ability to operate in a 24h standby and is on short call to support - exemplary their counterpart on the state level, the Special Deployment Commandos - or other federal and local agencies on request [2].

### **Structure and organisation**

Crucial for the success of the GTAZ and the GETZ is the co-operation between intelligence and police institutions and actors. The prerequisite for their co-operation "under one roof" was setting up two separate pillars, i.e. the Nachrichtendienstliche Informations- und Analysestelle (NIAS – Intelligence Information and Analysis Unit) and the Polizeiliche Informations- und Analysestelle (PIAS – Police Information and Analysis Unit). Both NIAS and PIAS members closely co-operate in several working groups (WG) that serve various purposes. Besides dealing with current cases and threat prognoses, they also draw up medium- or longer-term analyses [2].

### **Emergence of Special Forces GSG 9**

Modern terrorism made a name for itself during the 1972 Munich Olympics, when a group of Palestinian militants from the Black September organization captured Israeli athletes and fans. At that time, there were no special forces in West Germany capable of solving such complex problems. The operation to release the hostages was entrusted to the regular units of the Bavarian police. Police attacked a helicopter with hostages and terrorists on the runway at "Furstenfeldbruck" Airport. Being a great target themselves, they provoked the detonation of an explosive device prepared

in advance by terrorists. The explosion killed everyone who was in the helicopter: five hostages and five terrorists.

The need to create a special unit to fight terrorists has become obvious. Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was allowed to form a similar group within the federal border police. The unit was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Wegener, a special assignment officer under the Minister of the Interior. It took less than a year to form the unit. In April 1973, Wegener reported that the first two GSG-9s were ready for the mission. At the end of the acquisition, the group numbered 180 people. 6,300,000 German marks a year were allocated for its needs. This allowed the group commander to conduct tests of all types of weapons that could be obtained. When they could not find a suitable one, the appropriate weapon was developed by Hackler-Koch. Special uniforms were also developed for the group's fighters. In particular, all clothes and shoes are supplied by Adidas. Since the experience of their special forces was forgotten by the Germans, they took into account the experience of special forces of the army and police of the United States and Great Britain when working out tactical issues. However, as a working model, Wegener chose the structure of the special unit of the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces - "Saeret Matkal". This choice was made not by chance. Ulrich Wegener was an expert on terrorism and served in the Federal Border Police for 15 years. In the line of duty, he worked quite closely with his Israeli colleagues and acknowledged that their experience was quite effective [3].

#### **The loudest and most successful GSG operations**

**October 17–18, 1977:** Lufthansa Flight 181 was hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists demanding the release of Red Army Faction (RAF) members. GSG 9 officers stormed the aircraft on the ground in Mogadishu, Somalia, and freed all 86 hostages, killing three terrorists and capturing the remaining one.

**June 27, 1993:** Arrest of RAF terrorists Birgit Hogefeld and Wolfgang Grams in Bad Kleinen. The theory that Wolfgang Grams was executed in revenge for the death of GSG 9 operative Michael Newrzella during the mission (Grams had shot and killed Newrzella when Newrzella tried to tackle him) was discredited by the official investigation which found that Grams committed suicide.

**1993:** Ending of the hijacking of a KLM flight from Tunis to Amsterdam, redirected to Düsseldorf, without firing a single shot.

**2004:** GSG 9 is responsible for protecting German embassy property and personnel, including the embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. On April 7, 2004 two members were attacked and killed near Fallujah while in a convoy travelling from Amman, Jordan to Baghdad. The men, aged 25 and 38, were travelling in a car at the rear of the convoy, and therefore received most of the enemy fire after passing the ambush. The men were shot after their armoured Mitsubishi Pajero/Shogun was hit and stopped by RPGs. In a later

statement, the attackers apologized for mistaking the German convoy for an American convoy. One of the bodies is still missing.

**2007:** Three suspected terrorists were seized on Tuesday, 4 September 2007 for planning huge bomb attacks on targets in Germany. The bombs they were planning to make would have had more explosive power than those used in the Madrid and London terror attacks. They wanted to build a bomb in southern Germany capable of killing as many as possible. Fritz Gelowicz, 29, Adem Yilmaz, 29 and Daniel Schneider, 22, were charged with membership in a terrorist organization, making preparations for a crime involving explosives and, in Schneider's case, attempted murder.

**2009:** The GSG 9 were on the verge of boarding a German freighter, the MV Hansa Stavanger, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates. The case of the Hansa Stavanger, at this time off the Somali coast seemed sufficiently symbolic to justify another potentially successful rescue operation, though on a much larger scale. More than 200 GSG 9, equipped with helicopters, speedboats and advanced weapons, had been secretly brought, via Kenya, to a location 80 kilometres from the German freighter. The United States Navy helicopter carrier USS Boxer was lent to the Germans to act as their flagship, and a screen of German Navy warships flanked the Boxer. The ships had been patrolling near the Hansa Stavanger for days, waiting at a distance to evade detection on the pirates' radar screens. But the operation was called off before the rescue effort could begin. US National Security Advisor James L. Jones had called the Chancellery to cancel the operation. The US government, worried that the operation could turn into a suicide mission, was sending the USS Boxer back to the Kenyan port of Mombasa, where the German forces were to disembark. Officials at the German Federal Police headquarters in Potsdam, outside Berlin, concerned about the potential for a bloodbath, had also spoken out against the operation.

#### **Список використаних джерел**

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