technologies, to understand the possibilities they create for criminals and how they can be used as tools for fighting cybercrime. The IFCC serves as an example of an innovative approach to an emerging crime problem. It provides the benefits of community policing, forging an effective partnership between law enforcement at all levels, ordinary citizens, consumer protection organizations. The FBI's IFCC serves to facilitate and coordinate this collaborative effort.

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> *Югас О.*, здобувач ступеня вищої освіти Національної академії внутрішніх справ Консультант з мови: *Романов I.*

ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAPAN

Organized crime in Japan is represented by organizations called the "Yakuza". The Yakuza is a traditional form of organized crime in Japan, whose groups occupy a leading position in the country's criminal world. Yakuza members are also known as "gokudos". In literature and the press, the yakuza or its individual groups are often called the "Japanese mafia" or «boryokudan». Yakuza is based on the values of the patriarchal family, the principles of unquestioning submission to the boss and strict adherence to the rules (Mafia Code), for violation of which there is an inevitable punishment. Stability and longevity of the Yakuza clans provide both specific links between the boss and his subordinates, and the preservation of horizontal ("fraternal") relations between ordinary members of the group.

It is believed that the word yakuza comes from an insignificant hand in a Japanese card game similar to baccarat or blackjack: ja-ku-sa cards ("eight nine three"), when they are made, give the worst of possible results.

There are various theories about the emergence of such a phenomenon as the yakuza. The main one indicates that it all began in Japan in 1612, 12 years after the Great War. The army of the mighty Tokugawa Ieyasu, numbering 100,000 samurai, defeated the army of Ishida Mitsunari. Ishida himself was buried by the neck in the ground and executed with a blunt sword. Tokugawa Ieyasu became the de facto ruler of Japan. After this war, a large army was disbanded. Crowds of ryonins (samurai who were left

without owners) began to gather in gangs and rob peasants and townspeople.

One of the most famous was the White Swords gang - they wore white belts and scabbards for swords. If the "white sword" had no money, he did not pay at all. But if they were, it was always paid only with "rough money". Honest traders, having received too much money, tried to give the rest and immediately lost their heads. The White Swords never took the rest, considering it offensive. Neither the shogun's deputies nor the police could do anything with the bandits. And then came the mother-eco.

Initially, the mother-ekko (city guard) was created as protection from samurai gangs. Volunteers, mostly peasants and townspeople, became law enforcement officers. Very quickly mothers-ecos became national heroes. The most popular productions in the theater were those where the main characters were city law enforcement officers who protect the people from samurai atrocities. However, the real mother-eco was far from the characters of the kabuki theater. Yesterday's hooligans, fans of fights and adventurers became members of the city guard. Sometimes it happened that a detachment of the city guard came to the village plundered by the ryonins and instead of looking for bandits, completed the robbery, dooming the unfortunate to starvation.

Tokugawa was also at hand in creating the mother-ekko detachment – he did not have to deal with the destruction of samurai gangs himself. The shogun was far more afraid of his former soldiers than of the incapable city guard. That is why the government looked through its fingers at the robbery of the mother-eco.

In the end, it was Mother Ecko who emerged victorious from the deadly battle with Ronin. To Tokugawa's surprise, after the victory, the "self-defense units" did not think to disband themselves. They soon became a special caste, which marked the beginning of the future Japanese criminal world.

Television willingly prepares reports on solemn events in a particular clan: weddings, funerals. Often such events are attended by parliamentarians, influential representatives of business circles. The headquarters of the clans are well known not only to the police but also to the population. Most often, the emblems of this gangster association are attached to the facades of houses belonging to the yakuza.

There are 2330 gangster groups in Japan. All of them are subject to a complex system of interdependence. Some cooperate, others are deadly enemies, regularly arranging fights for the redistribution of spheres of influence. According to some experts, the annual income of the yakuza is about 1 trillion. he However, this figure is clearly underestimated, perhaps several times. Almost half of this amount (according to other data, more than one third) is income from the drug business. Drugs bring the mafia the most significant share of income.

Organized crime in Japan, as in other countries, resembles an octopus, whose tentacles cover almost all the shadowy aspects of public

life. Arms trade, prostitution, pornography, gambling, entertainment, professional sports, racketeering, supply of day laborers, unskilled labor, including from abroad, counterfeiting of securities, credit cards, piracy in the distribution of video and audio products, short-term lending, usury, speculation on construction contracts, real estate trade, the placement of "the right people" at command heights in municipalities, the business world, and finally, political scams, lobbying in parliament - everywhere there is a hard grip on the yakuza. At the same time, one tendency is noticeable: with the preservation and even some expansion of the sphere of illegal business, the semi-legal and often legal business controlled by the mafia is developing at a much faster pace.

The Yakuza collects its tithe from the owners of restaurants, cafes and snack bars. Big "profits" in modern Japan bring "intelligent" methods of robbery. For example, you can skillfully put your car under the bumper of a rich limousine and then, simulating a concussion or a hidden crack in the spine (doctors who are willing to testify to threatening health, but implicit injury, will always be found), for several years to "milk" a driver yawned, demanding money from him for treatment. There are many specialists in this business in Japan. According to experts, amicable settlement of the consequences of car accidents in most cases is not without yakuza.

Every Japanese can buy a stake in any company. If this package is significant, then its owner gets the right to participate in shaping the company's financial policy and receive dividends. And what privileges can one action give? Virtually none, except the right to attend the annual meeting of shareholders, which hears the report of the company's management for the past year. But the yakuza thinks differently.

By purchasing one or two shares of the company, gangsters get the keys to the company's safes. It happens like this. Appearing at a shareholders' meeting, racketeers arrange a brawl there, make noisy and insulting revelations of alleged abuses of the company's management that have taken place, and thus disrupt the approval of the financial statements. Meetings have to be postponed to another day, sometimes repeatedly, which confuses the work, leads to considerable material losses. "Sokaya" – as the racketeers call themselves, specializing in "servicing" the annual shareholders' meeting – are ready to behave decently, but, of course, for significant deviations from the management of the company. Moreover, by paying due diligence to the sokaya, the management of the joint-stock company can receive noisy support from the yakuza during the meeting, who can shut up any criticism if necessary.

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Юхименко К., курсант Національної академії внутрішніх справ Консультант з мови: *Козубенко I*.

SUPPORTING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

In every country in the world, law enforcement officials are at the frontline of efforts to combat organized crime. The building of criminal investigative and other law enforcement capacity is a core component of UNODC's work (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Technical assistance includes institutional and operational capacity building of law enforcement and judicial bodies to strengthen investigation and prosecution of organized crimes. Training is offered to police investigators, prosecutors and judges, criminal intelligence analysts, specialized drug and organized crime investigators and customs officials.

UNODC delivers a range of trainings to law enforcement officers on topics of relevance to fighting organized crime in their local contexts. It also employs modern technical training such as computer-based training as well as assistance in improving information exchange between law enforcement agencies, custom and border control authorities in different countries.

UNODC also supports evidence-based law enforcement responses by analyzing report questionnaires submitted by States parties to the Organized Crime Convention. On this basis, research conducted by UNODC is vital in identifying regional and global organized crime trends, forecasting future trends and strengthening the capacity of States to respond reactively and proactively.

Criminal intelligence has been described as the lifeblood of the fight against transnational organized crime. It is the foundation for all proactive investigations and a cross-cutting issue since the same expertise and methodology is used for all serious crimes, including, corruption, drug trafficking, and terrorism. A fundamental component of building law enforcement capacity involves enhancing understanding of how criminal intelligence works and how practically to develop, share and use it.

In order to operate internationally, individual Member States must have the capacity within their own law enforcement structures to collect, collate, analyze and disseminate information on criminals and the organizations within which they operate. UNODC is supporting criminal intelligence capabilities of law enforcement agencies through the provision of policy advice, assessment and gap analysis, and training of criminal analysts (including in using specialist analytical software), front-line law