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Economic intelligence and counter-intelligence in ensuring national economic interests: theoretical and applied aspect

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Abstract

The realities of today testify to the urgency of the development of modern theories of intelligence and counterintelligence activities, in particular in the aspect of ensuring national economic interests. The above confirms the relevance of studying the theoretical and applied principles of economic intelligence and counterintelligence. In this regard, the purpose of the article is to analyze the role of economic intelligence and counterintelligence in ensuring national economic interests through the prism of the theoretical and legal aspect. To achieve the goal, a system of general scientific and special research methods was used, in particular, dialectical, system-structural, and system analysis methods. The study for the first time formulated the definition of the concept of economic intelligence with a view to a macro-level activity approach – this type of it can not only contain the collection of information from open sources, but also be implemented by creating an agent network, corrupting officials or representatives of top management, stealing technological documentation, using false companies, cyber-attack organizations. The results of the research made it possible to distinguish the functioning models of economic intelligence: systematic, purposeful acquisition of information of a strategic nature; ensuring national economic interests through constant monitoring of strategic sectors of the economy of individual countries; conducting active influence measures by national special services. The conclusions presented in the article can be useful for security sector practitioners

Keywords:

espionage; economy; intelligence activities; special services; information; intelligence risks

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Introduction

Over the past two decades, the economy has pushed aside the political factor in international relations and has become the dominant factor in the struggle for global leadership among states, which has forced world leaders to radically rethink the main priorities of national security. Obtaining information on economic growth, the status of critical infrastructure facilities of individual countries, the introduction of the latest technologies, and the implementation of large investment projects remains an extremely important component of the activities of most national intelligence services. The competitiveness of national economies in today's global markets determines the ultimate dilemma of choosing between national progress and security, or poverty and instability. National governments are under increasing pressure to meet the growing needs of the population of their countries and therefore are forced to maintain the competitiveness of the state by any available means, among which one of the most important is the use of special services. Given this, the issues related both to the need to develop the capacity of the national economic intelligence system and to the development of qualitatively new approaches to counterintelligence protection of the national economic potential of the country are becoming more urgent.

Today, most leading countries have already created powerful, clearly structured systems of economic intelligence, the main elements of which are: separate state institutions (special services, diplomatic missions, foreign trade agencies, etc.); transnational corporations; enterprises of various forms of ownership, scientists and experts. There are a number of differences in the formation of national economic intelligence systems based on different traditions, cultures, structures and potentials of national economies. However, the main purpose of the functioning of all economic intelligence and counterintelligence structures is information and analytical support for making important decisions in securing national economic interests. It is also necessary to underline the importance of research projects primarily: the study of market competition, problems of limited natural resources and the development of strategic sectors of the economy.

Recently, the number of scientific publications devoted to various aspects of the development of economic intelligence has increased dramatically, and therefore it would be quite logical to expect an increase in the number of research projects and significant progress in the development of the theory and practice of counterintelligence activities in the economic sphere. This would be fully consistent with the new challenges and threats caused by the active participation of special services in obtaining various economic information. However, as the results of the analysis showed, this did not happen, which can be explained not only by a sufficiently high degree of secrecy of developments but also by the

extreme complexity of the problem due to its multi-vector and specificity.

Y.V. Harust & V.I. Melnyk [1], studying the work of law enforcement agencies in the protection of economic security, noted that "one of the priority tasks of any country aimed at its own sustainable and dynamic development and establishment of favourable conditions for the existence of an acceptable social and material status of its population remains the effective provision of economic security of the state. Successful implementation of this task requires the adoption of an appropriate range of organisational, legal, economic and a number of other state-legalised measures. One of such measures remains an effective and systematic counteraction to existing and latent destructive factors that negatively affect the normal course of economic processes".

In her study on economic and military intelligence, Yu.E. Muravska [2] emphasises, namely: "Currently, as a result of globalisation and computerisation, organisations and enterprises are required to apply in practice a broad and multidimensional analysis of competitors' activities at local, regional and global levels. It is no coincidence that such concepts as "strategic intelligence" or "economic intelligence" have become commonplace both in the theory and practice of the functioning of economic entities. Thus, the needs of the market determined creation of numerous economic intelligence agencies that meet the complex information demands of clients. According to the author, sources of market intelligence should be sought in the military. Many of the tools and methods of intelligence used in the military sphere were implemented in civilian economic intelligence services".

H. Tsyrfya perspective [3] on information security is also worth attention, namely: "The rapid spread of telecommunication networks, electronic resources and electronic delivery of information require the state to develop a strategy for information security, which should include the goal, objectives and a set of basic measures for its practical implementation, that is, a new policy that will effectively protect all areas of the state's economic policy with information support".

The key issue in the study of the theoretical foundations of counterintelligence activity is that scientists constantly have to address the dilemma of "American" and "European" approaches to understanding the basic concept. Thus, in the process of searching for a new paradigm of counterintelligence activity, scientists of the European community in most cases are forced to use the publications of American researchers as an empirical basis, since they are the most numerous and publicly available today. At the same time, there are growing differences between the American and European perspectives of the theory of counterintelligence, and therefore recent scientific studies suggest the need to reconsider the European concept of counterintelligence, which has

long been based on the American approach. Equally important is the development on this basis of theoretical foundations and features of counterintelligence activities in the economic sphere as part of countering economic intelligence.

Given the above, the purpose of the article is to substantiate the theoretical and methodological basis for establishing a paradigm of protecting national economic interests on the basis of modern theories of intelligence and counterintelligence activities and to determine the basic models of economic intelligence. To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been set:

- to identify the defining characteristics of the evolution of theoretical provisions explaining the essence of economic intelligence and counterintelligence;
- to generalise theoretical models and outline patterns of intelligence and counterintelligence activities;
- to systematise and generalise methodological principles of intelligence and counterintelligence research as a function of protecting national economic interests;
- to identify and determine the content of algorithms for building economic intelligence models.

Materials and Methods

The key component of the methodological toolkit was the dialectical method, which made it possible to highlight the genesis and interconnection of theoretical approaches to the interpretation of the concepts of economic intelligence and counterintelligence, the theoretical and methodological foundations of their research as a function of ensuring national economic interests, and to establish algorithms for building models of economic intelligence, the main of which include: obtaining information; ensuring national economic interests; active measures of influence by special services. This method has established the interrelation and contradiction of trends in the development of intelligence and counterintelligence theory at the present stage, on the basis of which it was found that there is a vacuum in the scientific literature since the developed theoretical basis of intelligence does not apply to counterintelligence. The article also addresses the key problem of the theoretical basis of counterintelligence activity – the dilemma of “American” and “European” approaches to understanding the basic concept.

The system-structural method is applied within the framework of substantiation of theoretical models of intelligence and counterintelligence activities, establishment of their regularities, role in the system of protection of economic interests of the state. This method made it possible to examine the activities of the relevant services of France, the United Kingdom, Spain, the People's Republic of China and the United States, etc., on the basis of which the content of the concept of economic intelligence through the prism of a macro-level activity approach was determined: this type of intelligence can involve not only collecting information from open

sources, but also through agent networks, by corrupting high-ranking officials, stealing technological documentation, using front companies, organising cyber attacks. Given the active role of the information component in the development of society, it is argued that an important system-forming factor of economic intelligence models is the information itself, which significantly affects the state of political, economic, social and other spheres, and therefore covers all areas of the market economy, allows to determine the interregional strategy of states, to avoid confrontation between the main economic blocs at the international level. The application of the system-structural method makes it possible to determine the algorithms that correspond to modern models of economic intelligence, which allows not only to satisfy national economic interests, neutralise relevant threats but also to make informed decisions in the global economic arena.

The method of system analysis allowed determining the specifics of algorithms for building economic intelligence models, and therefore to determine the best ways to build a system of domestic economic intelligence and counterintelligence in the economic sphere. Besides, this element of the methodological toolkit made it possible to establish a system of theoretical and applied principles of economic intelligence and counterintelligence, which are marked by a dichotomy of essential features: on the one hand, these are important elements of the system of ensuring national economic interests, on the other – key functions of the special services.

Besides, this element of the methodological toolkit made it possible to establish a system of theoretical and applied principles of economic intelligence and counterintelligence, which are characterised by a dichotomy of essential features: on the one hand, these are important elements of the system of ensuring national economic interests, on the other – key functions of the special services.

Results and Discussion

1. Theoretical and applied principles of defining economic intelligence and counterintelligence. Ukrainian scientific community considers the theoretical foundations of economic intelligence research primarily in terms of industrial espionage or the business economics discipline. Thus, O. Kryzhanovska [4], considering economic intelligence as a component of modern business activity, argues that it includes commercial and industrial intelligence. Thus, the term “economic intelligence” refers to a broader concept. The analysis of market reforms in the current context shows the intensification of illegal behaviour, primarily related to intelligence and espionage within the framework of competition.

While researching the trends of industrial espionage, Yu. Muravska [5], substantiates the need for active measures to protect against manifestations of industrial espionage: to determine what information is sensitive

and classify it as such; to conduct a risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities; to establish, analyse and update the security policy at the enterprise and to form appropriate guarantees both procedurally and technologically.

International academic discourse on the stated research topic is based, first of all, on conceptualisation, i.e. on the procedure of theoretical organisation of knowledge, subject to the isolation of an individual problem (while preserving links with related problems). This procedure involves: a) creating a theoretical and methodological model of the research, b) deriving concepts from observations and determining the links between them, c) formulating general statements, d) reflecting possible trends and changes within this research field, e) generating research hypotheses.

Thus, according to M. Taillard [6], economic intelligence data is more accessible than other intelligence information because most of the relevant indicators of a country's development can be taken from open sources. Economic intelligence data is based on information on the volume of sales of goods, specific types of goods and their availability, as well as the distribution and changes in the pricing of certain types of products, etc. By analysing such information, it is possible to determine the amount and types of resources used by another country, and the time frames of their consumption. All this not only allows determining the effectiveness of state economic strategies but also makes it possible to make predictions about the intentions of the leadership of other countries and to develop appropriate response scenarios.

M. Păduraru [7] believes that with the acceleration of globalisation processes and lifting of trade barriers, the task of being more competitive in the global and national markets has become more urgent for most organisations. In this context, the role of economic intelligence is to provide decision makers with relevant endogenous and exogenous data. Powerful multinational corporations were the first to recognise the potential of the latest available data to improve production efficiency. The integration of these mechanisms into national technological development strategies has enabled some countries to achieve and maintain significant competitive advantages. The development of public-private partnerships brings harmony between the interests of private institutions and national interests. Moreover, economic intelligence is an effective mechanism for increasing competitiveness [7].

At the same time, the number of scientific studies of methodological nature in the field of counterintelligence theory remains extremely insufficient. The main explanation for this state of affairs is that most of the relevant publications were authored by current employees of Western European and American intelligence services, who were very cautious about disclosing certain forms and methods of counterintelligence agencies' activities. Today, some of these materials have

become more accessible not only due to declassification, but also due to the development of information technology and the recognition of the fact that the principles and structure of counterintelligence activities, and the basic methods of counterintelligence are quite similar around the world, regardless of the type of state or the structure of the relevant agency [8].

In addition, the process of training in higher education institutions of counterintelligence profile, conducted by state security agencies, mostly remains closed to a wide research audience, and therefore its content is little known. However, the above does not apply to private educational institutions that teach their students the basics of supporting certain components of national security, intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Despite the fact that the majority of graduates of such institutions are in no position to use the acquired knowledge in full, and only a tiny part of them are related to special services in the future, the methodological base of these educational institutions is constantly being improved, and therefore, although with certain reservations, can already be used in the process of scientific research [9]. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of A. Glees [10], who argues that universities should pay more attention to training intelligence and counterintelligence professionals, in particular by introducing relevant materials into curricula. This will not only significantly better the public perception of the problems of intelligence and counterintelligence, but will also introduce greater transparency of their successful and failed practices to the public [10].

Thus, the theoretical and applied foundations of economic intelligence, and especially counterintelligence, on the one hand, as important elements of the system of ensuring national economic interests, and on the other – as key functions of special services, are insufficiently developed. The need for an in-depth study of the outlined issues is also accentuated by the limited research tools. As for the theory of counterintelligence activities, the closest to the true state of affairs seems to be the statement that there is a vacuum in the scientific literature, since “the developed theoretical basis of intelligence does not apply to counterintelligence”. This position is based on the analysis of the array of special literature published over the past two decades, among which there were only two thorough studies devoted directly to the theory of counterintelligence activities [11].

2. Methodological foundations of economic intelligence. The term “economic intelligence” was introduced by M. Porter [12] after the publication of his monograph “Competitive Strategy: Techniques for analysing industries and competitors.”. The author suggested that this concept should be understood as the activity of collecting and analysing information aimed at increasing the competitiveness of a firm or industry. The term became widespread after the publication of a special thematic report prepared by H. Martre [13] in 1994

for the French government. Based on the report's materials, economic intelligence is a set of coordinated measures to collect, process and disseminate information that is useful for economic entities. One of the significant achievements of the report was the creation of a new state institution – the High Representative for Economic Affairs (in 2016 it was transformed into the Service of Strategic Information and Economic Security – Service de l'information stratégique et sécurité économique, SISSE) [14].

An important methodological caveat to the study of the theoretical foundations of economic intelligence is the need to distinguish between economic intelligence itself and economic espionage [15; 16; 17]. The rapid development of the latest technologies results in many governments realising that the main condition for their competitiveness in the global economy is the need to invest huge capital investments in leading domestic industries, which does not always coincide with the real financial capabilities of the state. Therefore, political decisions often break the line between economic intelligence and economic espionage. For states that can afford significant financial injections for the development of leading sectors of the economy, economic intelligence and avoiding economic espionage are more typical since it can lead to significant negative consequences in relations with strategic partners. However, for some countries, such a strategy seems impossible, and they decide to steal technologies or secretly take possession of important financial and economic information. These countries can run quite legitimate businesses, they are full participants in the international division of labour, but they supplement their own economic growth with the benefits of economic espionage. The benefits of such activities are quite clear and well-established. Thus, illegal possession of completed technological developments makes it possible to produce and sell products without spending resources on their research and introduction to the market. For certain industries, such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, computer hardware and software, production of military equipment, the acquisition of production technology, even one high-performance product, can cause huge losses to the developing country.

The American academic community proposes to distinguish between economic intelligence, economic espionage and industrial espionage. Thus, the term "economic intelligence" refers to the acquisition of political or important commercial information of an economic nature, including technological data, financial, commercially sensitive and governmental information, the receipt of which will directly or indirectly contribute to the competitive position of the economy of the recipient country. Most commonly, this category is defined as a way of managing and controlling information that applies to all sectors of the economy, the use of intellectual activity in the formulation of economic decisions [18].

Economic intelligence is an important element of the system of economic security of the state. Most economic intelligence is legally collected from open sources, no covert, coercive or operational methods are used. At the same time, in some cases, economic intelligence is also conducted through the use of illegal methods and this activity is called economic and industrial espionage.

Economic espionage refers to the use or promotion of illegal, secret, coercive or deceptive activities by a foreign government or its representative in order to obtain economic data. Economic espionage may include gathering information, acquiring or stealing a manufactured product by covert means with the intent of using reverse engineering. Foreign intelligence services intending to engage in economic espionage may use any methods of collecting intelligence data. The most commonly used methods are HUMINT and SIGINT. It is a form of involuntary exchange of information, which is used by those weaker in scientific and industrial terms, learning or trying to catch up [19].

Industrial espionage is the illegal or covert collection of intelligence sponsored by an individual or private enterprise to gain a competitive advantage. These actions are aimed at collecting proprietary materials or trade secrets. The term also makes it impossible to legally collect open-source data. Industrial espionage is especially common in the United States and is practised mainly by foreign corporations or aimed at American corporations operating abroad. Often, firms whose main activity is industrial espionage cooperate with national intelligence services or conduct intelligence operations under the auspices of their governments [20].

Research institutions and production complexes of the military-industrial complex are particularly affected by industrial espionage since most countries use economic espionage to improve the military capabilities of their national armed forces, as well as to increase the competitiveness of their weapons. The investments required to maintain military advantages can be measured in billions of dollars, but the desire of individual corporations to make a profit at any cost leads to significant risks to the effectiveness of such investment projects.

The terms "industrial espionage" and "competitive intelligence" should be differentiated. Thus, industrial espionage is mainly considered to obtain illegally confidential information about the activities of competitors, a complex range of measures aimed at obtaining competitive advantages, which leads to huge financial losses [21]. This can be, for example: stealing information that constitutes expertise; bribing an employee of the enterprise who has confidential information; stealing databases and descriptions of technological processes, etc. Such information can be requested not only by large companies but also by government agencies and special services. Also, modern industrial espionage can cause significant damage to the company's activities by

using psychological pressure on employees to destabilise the activities of a competitor company.

The key feature of competitive intelligence is the legal process of collecting, accumulating, storing and analysing disclosed information about the functioning of a particular company to make optimal decisions in the management link, taking measures to increase competitiveness, prevent possible economic risks and increase the value of the company [3].

The purpose of both industrial espionage and competitive intelligence is to obtain information about the activities of competitors. At the same time, these two activities differ in methods and means of obtaining information: the former is illegal, unlike the latter. Industrial espionage involves operational work to collect specific information, while the result of competitive intelligence, among other things, is the formulation of recommendations for management decisions [22].

Thus, the term “economic intelligence” should be understood as a purposeful activity of public and private entities aimed at obtaining information on the financial and economic policy of the state (including its technological aspects), and any other information that will directly or indirectly contribute to the growth of competitive advantages of the donor country in the international global and national markets. The majority of economic intelligence data is formed from information collected from open sources. At the same time, customers of an intelligence product are no less interested in information obtained using secret methods of intelligence activities. This activity may include obtaining information by creating an agent network, corrupting officials or top management representatives, stealing technological documentation, using shell companies, organising cyber attacks, and so on.

3. Methodological foundations of counterintelligence. The substantive characteristic of the concept of counterintelligence in the writings of most researchers on the subject follows from the generic concept of intelligence. To understand counterintelligence, it is proposed to consider the concept of intelligence in several contexts: activities or processes aimed at obtaining information; a set of information obtained as a result of the processing; an organisation whose activities are aimed at obtaining, receiving and processing information (for example, the intelligence community); reports, briefings that are the result of the organisation’s activities. The key element in all these definitions is information. Sometimes raw data is called intelligence, but this assertion cannot be considered correct – information is transformed into intelligence only after appropriate analysis and giving it meaningful content in accordance with previously formulated tasks. At the same time, intelligence is divided into four segments according to the following main functions: espionage, surveillance, analysis and research, and covert operations. Espionage and surveillance are aimed at supporting analysis and research. In

turn, the combination of these sectors supports covert operations. Hence, it is concluded that counterintelligence is a key element that combines all four parts of intelligence functions [23].

The main difference between the function of collecting and obtaining information in intelligence and research and analytical functions in business or trade is the secrecy factor of certain aspects of this activity [24]. Therefore, secrecy should be the basic characteristic of counterintelligence: “...counterintelligence should be aimed against intelligence, against active hostile intelligence, against enemy spies” [25].

Although intelligence is usually divided into three main categories – operational, tactical and strategic, the taxonomy of counterintelligence in most publications is based on the other two categories – defence and offence. These categories were proposed by intelligence researchers, but this approach seems to be quite successful in forming the essential characteristics of counterintelligence activities. For example, the taxonomy of counterintelligence of the US Marine Corps is as follows: operations; investigations; information acquisition and reporting; analysis, production and dissemination of information products [26].

The analysis of counterintelligence in terms of defensive and offensive categories suggests that the so-called “defensive” counterintelligence combines those activities aimed at deterrence and detection. At the same time, “offensive” counterintelligence, in addition to detection activities, involves misleading and neutralising the enemy. The purpose of detection activities being included in both types of counterintelligence may be the possession of information security tools or active measures aimed at finding persons who violate the legislation on state secrets.

The approach of the American academic community is that there are five main types of counterintelligence in terms of activities in the following areas: national security; military; law enforcement; business counterintelligence; private counterintelligence [27]. It is important to note that these typological areas may overlap, for example, investigating the leak of classified information on the deployment of troops in a foreign country will be of interest to both military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies ensuring national security. Besides this typological overlap in the areas of activity, there may also be a functional overlap between defensive and offensive functions used by intelligence services. For example, the US intelligence community, headed by the Director of National Intelligence, is structured into an alliance of seventeen major intelligence services (the CIA is the leading political intelligence service of the US government independent of other ministries and agencies, the other sixteen members of the community are part of various US federal ministries and agencies). Despite the fact that the alliance is generally focused on intelligence, a number

of agencies have special units that are engaged in counterintelligence activities [28].

Common in the approaches of representatives of American and European scientific schools of counterintelligence theory is the interpretation of counterintelligence as one of the functions of national security. At the same time, this approach is subject to criticism: *“Obviously, the role of counterintelligence has been misunderstood, as for a long time there were no coherent theories of counterintelligence that would satisfy the practice. Therefore, the formation of the corresponding theory was carried out by practitioners who were guided by their own needs, and not by a deep understanding of the principles of constructing theoretical concepts. While there is nothing wrong with practice- and needs-based approach, it makes the practice less effective and therefore less effective.”* [29].

Since the researchers had no issues with the availability of secondary information explaining or describing the practice of counterintelligence in the process of studying the empirical basis of counterintelligence activities, these data were taken as the basis for the development of the relevant theory. The relevant information was obtained mainly from literary sources. The next step was to establish an appropriate logical structure (model), which became the basis of the most common theory of counterintelligence activities.

4. Algorithms for constructing models of economic intelligence. Based on the above analysis, it is possible to highlight the features of counterintelligence activities in the economic sphere as a key element of the system of protection of economic interests. According to the results of the analysis, the most successful approach to the organisation and coordination of complex counterintelligence measures of economic nature is demonstrated by the special services of France. Thus, the National Map of Intelligence Risks has been developed and is functioning in the country, containing not only their list but also specific measures to minimise them. All of them are aimed at countering the possible conduct of espionage operations organised by foreign special services or private structures [30]. The project engages all research laboratories in the country, start-ups, and more than 20 thousand organisations and enterprises involved in the operation of the state defence complex. Each ministry develops clearly defined so-called “restricted zones” (fr. Les Zones À Régime Restrictif, ZRR), which must be agreed upon with the General Secretariat for National Defence and Security (SGDSN). Each enterprise or organisation has its own state-appointed curator (usually a representative of special services). Practical preventive measures include: control of access to premises, and regular verification of personnel, visitors and external suppliers carried out by competent special services (DGSE, DGSI, SCRT, DRM, DRSD) [31]. Besides, companies are advised to give preference to French or EU partners, avoid using free cloud storage solutions, not share strategic commercial

information, encrypt information transmitted to suppliers, and not use an administrator account to perform daily tasks. It is also recommended to conduct a regular audit of the infrastructure that discloses production processes and constantly monitor compliance with the terms of the contract. In case of any deviations from the secrecy policy or external interference, the company is obliged to inform DGSI and/or DRSD [31].

In addition to the above, an effective measure to counter economic espionage is the use of the relevant European Union Directive by the interested structures [32]. It is significant that the French Criminal Code provides for punishment for economic espionage up to 20 years in prison [33].

Today almost every leading national special service has a significant arsenal of forms and methods of economic intelligence. For example, in 1994, the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland adopted the Intelligence Service Act [34], which granted the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) quite broad powers to obtain such information, extending it to “all areas relating to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”. In March 1994, the French government obliged its own intelligence services to significantly expand operations to obtain information of an economic nature, for the coordination of which the Committee on Economic Competitiveness and Security was established the following year [20]. Also, in France, a special educational and scientific institution École de Guerre Économique (EGE), which trains doctors of sciences of the relevant profile, is successfully functioning today [35].

The Armed Forces of Spain are directly integrated into the national system of economic intelligence, besides providing full information on the regions where foreign peacekeeping campaigns are conducted with their participation, they also offer the following services: training of private companies’ personnel in the basics of information analysis, cybersecurity, information protection. The direct participation of the military in the work of most structures of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Spain, and in conducting defence research is common. The question of creating a National Interagency Intelligence School on the basis of the Spanish Armed Forces, one of the activities of which will be targeted training of economic intelligence specialists, is also being considered [36].

For a long period of time, the largest donor of economic intelligence has been the People’s Republic of China. This issue is mainly handled by the Ministry of State Security of the People’s Republic of China, the Special Department of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army of China, and the Department of Military Intelligence [37].

The United States of America also pays considerable attention to matters of economic intelligence development. In addition to the CIA, the US National Security Agency is also authorised in this sphere, which has dramatically increased the capabilities of

information acquisition as a result of the introduction of the new ECHELON system, which can intercept millions of electronic messages around the world [38]. At the same time, the USA pays quite serious attention to the threats caused by numerous attempts to collect economic information in the country. It is believed that the acquisition of economic information and data on critical technologies by foreign intelligence services threatens not only the viability of industry but also the national security of the United States as a whole. Therefore, the espionage activities of foreign intelligence services aimed at the economic potential of the state back in 1993 were included (and remain today) as one of the seven most urgent threats to national security, on which the efforts of the FBI counterintelligence units should be focused [39]. Thus, according to this special service, the main efforts of foreign intelligence services and representatives of corporate intelligence were focused on obtaining information related to research and development in the following industries and areas: pharmaceuticals and medicine, computer software, chemical technology, electronic banking, optics, and telecommunications. Efforts also focused on collecting information on corporate negotiating positions, cost and pricing structures, marketing plans, contract bids, customer lists, and new products and services. A particular focus was given to the national laboratories of the US Department of Energy related to the development of modern energy supply technologies [40].

One of the most successful modern models of economic intelligence is considered to be the Japanese one, which, with regard to national differences, has been introduced by some countries, in particular the PRC, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. The key priority is state support for the international expansion of domestic companies. All issues related to Japan's economic intelligence are directly coordinated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) [41].

The system comprises public institutions and private companies and operates in the following strategic rigid vertically constructed dimensions: a global and local approach to markets; trade strategies that are well adapted to the economic and cultural context of each country; long-term economic strategy; accurate and detailed information policies pursued by private companies with a daily reporting system; integration and coordination of economic centres; partial and selective distribution of information based on access levels; corporate training programmes for young professionals aimed at providing and improving specific skills, including the understanding of local culture and language, depending on the companies and their location [42].

The European model is characterised by much less rigidity of vertical links, but the common feature with the Japanese model is the strong coordination and integration of all activities carried out at the state, corporate and individual (including academic) levels. Unlike the United States, in most European countries, government

structures play a leading role in coordinating the activities of all participants in the system. As for special services, they perform mainly the most responsible and non-public tasks to obtain important economic information [41].

The analysis shows the relevance of defining the concept of economic intelligence in view of the macro-level activity approach – this type of intelligence can include not only collecting information from open sources but also occur through the creation of an agent network, corruption of officials or representatives of top management, theft of technological documentation, the use of front companies, organisation of cyber attacks (methods of economic intelligence are increasingly converging with economic espionage).

The concept of economic intelligence serves as a generalising category and correlates with other concepts considered as general and partial. The analysis allows the authors to propose the following algorithms for building modern models of economic intelligence:

- an algorithm of systematic, targeted acquisition of strategic information on the economic development of a particular country, which allows the political leadership of the state to reduce uncertainty in decision-making, thereby significantly increasing the economic competitiveness of the country and domestic companies in the global arena;

- an algorithm for protecting national economic interests, which provides for constant monitoring of strategic sectors of the economy of a number of certain countries. Active measures are also expected to be taken to neutralise the threats of negative external financial and economic influences. Equally important is the function of countering transnational organised crime and terrorism, which remains the prerogative of special intelligence services and law enforcement agencies;

- algorithm of active measures of influence by national special services. Their main goal is to enhance the presence of the state and representatives of domestic business in the world markets, including markets of strategic importance to other countries.

Conclusions

The study allowed reaching a number of conclusions, among which the main ones are the following.

1. Based on the study of the characteristics of the evolution of theoretical provisions that interpret the concept of economic intelligence and counterintelligence, it is found that a characteristic feature of the development of the theoretical foundations of special services, in particular, the theory of counterintelligence in the Western scientific paradigm is its relative conservatism. The relevant methodology has remained almost unchanged for many years, but a significant part of special methods of activity has undergone significant changes due to the accelerated development of advanced technologies. This has given grounds for international and national support for the need to change the current paradigm of intelligence and counterintelligence.

2. The generalisation of theoretical models and outlining the patterns of intelligence and counterintelligence activities has shown the need to change the conceptual boundaries of intelligence and counterintelligence, because theorists and practitioners of special services have realised the urgency of new challenges and threats (especially of a non-standard and hybrid nature) that cannot be detected and prevented through the use of outdated methods. Besides, an additional need to change approaches has arisen due to the greater accessibility of information to the general public, including classified information, as a result of the spread of cyber attacks on the information resources of state institutions and critical infrastructure facilities. The main forms and methods of intelligence and counterintelligence activities began to be actively used by representatives of transnational organised crime and terrorist groups. Since there are no legal, ethical, financial or any other restrictions and boundaries of criminal activity for them, special services must reach a qualitatively new level of efficiency in their activities.

3. The systematisation and generalisation of the methodological foundations of the study of intelligence and counterintelligence as functions of protection of national economic interests made it possible to assert that counterintelligence serves as a key element that combines all aspects of intelligence functions (activities aimed at obtaining information; a set of information obtained as a result of the processing; an organisation whose activities are aimed at obtaining

and processing information; the results of the organisation's activities). As of today, Ukraine lacks traditions, structures, mechanisms and tools for economic intelligence and counterintelligence. It is primarily a matter of building a system with coordinated mechanisms for the activities of state institutions and structures, transnational corporations, private companies, local governments, educational institutions and experts. The main functional purpose of this system should be to promote the economic security of Ukraine.

4. The results of the study showed that models of economic intelligence can correspond to three main algorithms: an algorithm for obtaining information; an algorithm for protecting national economic interests; and an algorithm for active measures of influence on the part of special services. The models of economic intelligence proposed in the study can be used in establishing a system of domestic economic intelligence and counterintelligence in the economic sphere. For in Ukraine, the term "economic intelligence" as it is understood by most economically developed countries is rarely applied. Modern models of economic intelligence can correspond to algorithms for developing models of economic intelligence, the main of which include: obtaining information; protecting national economic interests; active measures of influence by special services.

A promising area for further scientific research is the study of the features of the Western system of training specialists in economic intelligence and counterintelligence.

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Економічна розвідка та контррозвідка в забезпеченні національних економічних інтересів: теоретико-прикладний аспект

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Анотація

Реалії сьогодення засвідчують нагальність розвитку сучасних теорій розвідувальної та контррозвідувальної діяльності, зокрема в аспекті забезпечення національних економічних інтересів. Зазначене підтверджує актуальність вивчення теоретико-прикладних засад економічної розвідки та контррозвідки, що означені дихотомією сутнісних ознак: з одного боку, це важливі елементи системи забезпечення національних економічних інтересів, з іншого – ключові функції діяльності спеціальних служб. У зв'язку з цим, метою статті є здійснення аналізу ролі економічної розвідки та контррозвідки в забезпеченні національних економічних інтересів крізь призму теоретико-правового аспекту. Для досягнення поставленої мети використано систему загальнонаукових і спеціальних методів дослідження, зокрема діалектичний, системно-структурний і метод системного аналізу. У дослідженні вперше сформульовано визначення

поняття економічної розвідки з огляду на макрорівневий діяльнісний підхід – цей її вид не лише може містити збирання інформації з відкритих джерел, а й реалізовуватися шляхом створення агентурної мережі, корумпування чиновників чи представників топ-менеджменту, крадіжки технологічної документації, використання підставних фірм, організації кібератак. Виокремлено моделі функціонування економічної розвідки: систематичне, цілеспрямоване здобування інформації стратегічного характеру; забезпечення національних економічних інтересів шляхом постійного моніторингу стратегічних галузей економіки окремих країн; проведення національними спеціальними службами активних заходів впливу. Наведені висновки можуть бути корисними для фахівців-практиків безпекового сектору, зокрема спеціалістів з економічної безпеки, а також слугувати підґрунтям для належного проведення спецслужбами безпекоорієнтованих процедур інвестиційної діяльності, здійснення аналітиками оцінки конкурентоспроможності національних економік на глобальному ринку

Ключові слова:

шпигунство; економіка; розвідувальна діяльність; спеціальні служби; інформація; розвідувальні ризики